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I. INTRODUCTION

"When is a man a man, and when is a woman a woman?" 1 According
to Chief Justice Hardberger, that was the basic question that the Texas
Court of Appeals needed to answer in Littleton v. Prange.According to
Justice Hardberger, "[elvery school child, even of tender years, is confident
he or she can tell the difference, especially if the person is wearing no
clothes." 2 Yet when Christie Littleton, a person who dressed as a woman,
had the breasts, hormones and genitalia of a woman, and who every school
child would identify as a woman, presented herself to the Texas Court of
Appeals, the court declared she was legally a man.
How could the court reach a result that even a school child would find
hard to understand? It reached this result because Christie is a transsexual
and had been identified as a male at birth. According to the Texas Court of
Appeals, this identification, and the presence of male anatomy at birth,
permanently established Christie's legal sex as male.

Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law. J.D., 1979, University of Michigan;
B.A., 1972, University of Michigan. I want to thank Marybeth Herald, Robert Irving, and Sherri
Groveman for the helpful comments they provided on earlier drafts of this article.
1. Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223,223 (Tex. App. 1999).
2. Id.
*
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In Littleton, the court was faced with the question of how to determine
a post-operative transsexual's legal sex for purposes of marriage.3 This
issue is complex because although Christie was born with male anatomy,
Christie's anatomy was predominantly female at the time of trial.4 Because
the Texas legislature had not provided any guidelines on how to determine
a person's sex 5 and Texas case law on the subject did not exist, the court
had the opportunity to look to case law and legislation from other
jurisdictions, and guidance from experts in other fields, such as medicine
and psychology. The court should have based its holding on an
examination of the developments in other disciplines, an analysis of the
policy concerns that arise in cases involving sex determination, and a
comparison of the justifications for the contrary results reached in other
jurisdictions on similar cases. Instead, it chose to rely on religious rhetoric,
and ruled that when God created Christie Littleton, God created a man that
neither the law nor the medical community could turn into a woman.'
This Article examines the policy considerations that arise when courts
are faced with the issue of determining the legality of marriages involving
post-operative transsexuals.7 The enactment of federal 8 and state9

3. Id. at 225.
4. At the time of the trial, the only male biological attribute she retained was presumably an
XY chromosomal structure. In actuality, her chromosomal make-up was not admitted into evidence,
so whether she actually had XY chromosomes is unclear.
5. Although the Texas legislature has not passed any legislation on this issue, a number of
other states have determined that transsexuals who have undergone genital modification surgery are
entitled to amend their official documents to indicate their self-identified sex. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 22-9A-19 (1997); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-326(a)(4) (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-2-115(4) (West 1990); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-217(d) (1995); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-23(e)
(Harrison 1998); 10 GUAM CODE ANN. § 3222 (1998); HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(4)(b) (1993);
410 ILL COmP. STAT. ANN. § 535(d)17 (West 1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144.23.3 (West 1997);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §40:62 (West 1992); MD. CODEANN. HEALTH-GEN. I, § 4-214(b)(5) (1999);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 46 § 13(e) (West 1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.2891 (9)(a) (1998);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 193.215(9) (West Supp. 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 71-604.01 (1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 26:8-40.12 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-25(D) (Michie 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 130A-1 18(b)(4) (1997); OR.REV. STAT. § 432.235(4) (1997); UTAHCODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (Supp.
1998); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 69.15(1)(a) (West 1990). Whether such an amendment to one's official
documents will change the transsexual's legal sex for purposes ofmarriage is unclear. See infra note
116 and accompanying text.
6. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
7. The resolution of this issue has a direct effect on the tens-of-thousands of persons who
are transsexuals, the millions ofpeople who areintersexuals (people whose biological sex attributes
are not all congruent), and the millions of people who transsexuals and intersexuals have married
or seek to marry. The exact incidence of transsexuality and intersexuality are unknown. Some
estimates indicate that between 3000 to 6000 transsexuals have undergone hormonal and surgical
sex modifications in the United States. See DAVID W. MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW
221 (2d ed. 1990). Another 30,000 to 60,000 people consider themselves candidates. See id. Some
estimates indicate that approximately 10,000 transsexuals live in the United States. See id.Although
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legislation during the late 1990s and recent Supreme Court decisions in
Hawaii and Vermont"0 have caused the validity of same-sex marriages to
become part of a growing national debate. An analysis of marriages
involving transsexuals helps to illuminate some of the policy concerns that
should shape that debate.
Part II of this Article sets forth the factual and legal setting of Littleton
v. Prange.Part Il examines the three opinions in the Littleton decision.
Part IV concludes that the court opinions in Littleton, and other similar
cases, lack the rigorous analysis that is required to resolve this complex and
important issue. Part IV also explores the policy issues that should be
considered when courts''
and legislatures are inevitably presented with this
2
critical question.1
1I. LITTLETON V. PRANGE-THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL SETTING

A. The Facts
Christie Littleton was born with normal male genitalia; at birth she had

the exact incidence of intersexuality is also uncertain, intersexuals constitute between one-tenth of
one percent to four percent of the population. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The FiveSexes: Why Male
and Female Are Not Enough, SCIENCES, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 21; see also ALICE D. DREGER,
HERMAPHRODrrES AND THE MEDICAL INVENTION OF SEX 42-43 (1998).
8. Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). See
infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 118-45 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 14849 and accompanying text.
11. The Texas Supreme Court denied a review of the appellate court decision in Littleton v.
Prange,9 S.W.3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), review denied on Mar. 3,2000; rehearing of petition for
review overruled on May 18, 2000. Ms. Littleton's attorneys filed a petition for writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court on July 3, 2000.
12. A number of cases on this subject are in the process of being negotiated or litigated. For
example, in California, a post-operative male-to-female transsexual married a female in England
and sought employment-relatedbenefits for her spouse. See Chris Beam, ForBetterorForWorse?,
OUT, May 2000, at 60, 60-63. In Kansas, a male-to-female post operative transsexual's right to
inherit from her husband's estate is being litigated. See Devon Spurgeon, Double Bind: Woman in
MissouriIs a Man in Kansas, and Why, WALLST. J., July 7, 2000, at A-1. In New Hampshire, the
U.S. Postal Service is refusing to acknowledge a male-to-female transsexual's right to be treated
as a female. (Copies of the court documents in these cases are on file with the author.) These and
other similar cases will likely reach the appellate courts. Now that the transsexual and intersexual
movements are gaining momentum, the number of cases being brought to determine the legal sex
of a transsexual are likely to increase dramatically. Evidence of the increased interest in the issues
involving transsexuals and intersexuals is evident from the number of times they have been the
subject of the popular press and the media. Recent television programs, including Dateline NBC
and ABC's Primetime Live, news articles in publications such as the New York Times, the Wall
Street Journal,Newsweek, and Time magazines, and movies such as the recent Golden Globe and
Academy Award winner, Boys Don't Cry, have focused on transsexual or intersexual issues.
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a penis, scrotum, and testicles. 3 The birth attendant identified Christie as
a male and her parents named her Lee, after her father.1 4 At a very young
age, when she was only three or four, Christie realized that she identified
as a female. 5 At some point, her parents took her to a physician, who
prescribed male hormones.16 Despite the presence of natural male
hormones and the administration of additional male hormones, Christie's
self-identity remained female throughout her life. 7
By age seventeen, Christie began searching for a doctor to perform
surgery to conform her physical attributes to her gender identity.18 Starting
at age twenty-three, Christie underwent the psychological and psychiatric
treatment that is required prior to sex modification surgery.' 9 At age
twenty-five, Christie had her name legally changed and she began to
receive various treatments and female hormones.20 Two years later, she
underwent three surgical procedures in which her penis, scrotum and
testicles were surgically removed and a vagina and labia were surgically
created. 2' She also underwent breast construction surgery.22 After the
successful completion of these medical treatments, Christie appeared to be
a woman. 23 She dressed as a woman, her body had only female external
attributes (breasts, vagina, and labia), and she was able to engage in sexual
intercourse as a woman. 24
In 1989, at age twenty-seven, Christie married Jonathon Mark Littleton
in Kentucky. 25 They lived together as husband and wife until Jonathon's
death in 1996.26 Throughout this time, Jonathon was aware of Christie's
medical history and he accepted Christie as a woman and as his wife.27
Jonathon was not the only person to accept Christie as a woman.28 In
addition, three different legal institutions acknowledged that Christie was
a woman. In 1977, Texas officials allowed Christie to legally take a
woman's name.29 In 1989, Kentucky officials allowed Christie to marry a
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 225.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 224. This name change does not have the effect of changing Christie's legal
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man.30 Finally, a Texas trial court acknowledged that Christie was a woman
when it granted Christie's petition to amend her original birth31certificate to
indicate that her name was Christie and her sex was female.
B. The Legal Setting
Christie and Jonathon lived together as a married couple for seven years
until Jonathon's death.32 After Jonathon died, Christie brought a medical
malpractice suit under the Texas Wrongful Death and Survival Statute in
her capacity as Jonathon's surviving wife. 33 Dr. Mark Prange, the
defendant, brought a motion for summary judgment challenging Christie's
status as a proper wrongful death beneficiary.34 Dr. Prange asserted that
Christie was a male and she did not have standing to bring an action under
the wrongful death statute because legally she could not be the surviving
spouse of another man.3 5 The trial court agreed with Dr. Prange and granted
his motion for summary judgment. 36 The Texas Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling. 37
According to Justice Hardberger, the case involved two legal issues: the
validity of same-sex marriages and the legal sex status of post-operative
transsexuals. 3' The law in Texas on the first issue is clear: if Christie were
a man, she could not legally be married to Jonathon because same-sex
marriage is illegal in Texas.39

sex.
30. See id. at 225. Kentucky does not allow marriages between individuals of the same sex.
See Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §402.020(l)(d)
(Banks-Baldwin 1999). Therefore, the official who issued the Kentucky marriage license accepted
Christie's status as a woman. It is not clear, however, whether the Kentucky official knew that
Christie was a transsexual. If the legality of the Kentucky marriage were to be litigated in Kentucky,
the Kentucky court could choose to ignore the marriage certificate and adopt the same holding as
did the Texas court.
31. TheTexas trial court granted the petition based uponTEx. HEALTH& SAFETYCODEANN.
§ 191.028 (Vernon 1992) which allows an amendment if the record was "incomplete or proved by
satisfactory evidence to be inaccurate." The trial court granted the amendment based upon the
uncontroverted affidavit of an expert stating that Christie is a female. Therefore, it appears that the
Texas court that authorized the amendment to the birth certificate acknowledged that post-operative
transsexuals are legally entitled to amend their official documents to indicate their self-identified
sex.
32.
33.
34.
35.

See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
See id.
See id.
See id.

36. See id.
37. See id. at 231.
38. See id. at 225.
39. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 2.001 (b)(Vernon 1998) provides: "[a] license may not be issued

for the marriage of persons of the same sex."
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The second issue is more complex. Numerous legislatures ° and some
courts4 in jurisdictions other than Texas have ruled on the factors that
control sex determination for transsexuals. The Texas legislature has never
adopted legislation on this matter and at the time this action was filed, the
Texas courts had not been faced with the issue. The only indication of the
legislature's intent in this matter is Texas Health and Safety Code §
191.028 which entitles people to amend their birth certificates if their birth
records were "incomplete or proved by satisfactory evidence to be
inaccurate."42 The legislative intent of this statute is unclear. It does not
specifically refer to transsexuals, and when it was drafted transsexuals were
not likely considered or discussed.43 Therefore, the case was one of first
impression for the Texas Court of Appeals and no binding legislation or
precedent dictated the outcome.
The evidence presented to the appellate court was not extensive. The
facts presented above were introduced as well as Christie's original birth
certificate indicating that she was a male.' The only additional evidence
was the stipulation of the parties as to the intended testimony of the
medical experts who had treated Christie.4 These medical experts
consisted of Dr. Donald Greer, a board certified plastic surgeon, and Dr.
Paul Mohl, a board certified psychiatrist.46 Both parties to the litigation
stipulated that the doctors, if allowed to testify, would assert that:
* Christie Littleton is a transsexual, someone whose physical
anatomy does not correspond to his/her sense of being or
sense of gender.47
• Medical science has been unable to identify the exact
cause of transsexuality, but it is probably a combination of
neuro-biological,
genetic, and neonatal environmental
48
factors.
" Male-to-female transsexuals are psychologically and
psychiatrically female before and after their sex

40. See supra note 5. Legislatures that have enacted statues allowing an amendment to the
sex indicator on a birth certificate typically have allowed post-operative transsexuals to amend their
official documents so that they reflect the transsexual's self-identified sex. Id. One state specifically
denies this right to transsexuals. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-203(d) (1996).
41.

See Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexualityand the Collision

Between Law andBiology, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 288-307 (1999) for a detailed discussion of the
court opinions.
42. TX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 191.028 (West 2000).
43. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id. at 224.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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reassignment.49
* Christie Littleton has the capacity to function sexually as
a female."
" Christie Littleton "is medically a woman."5'
The Texas Court of Appeals believed that it was within the legislature's
province to determine the guidelines that should govern the recognition of
marriages involving transsexuals.5 2 The court acknowledged that it had no
control over whether or when the legislature would choose to make such
a determination.5 3 Although the court admitted that it could write a
"protocol" for determining the legal sex of a transsexual, it believed it had
no authority to fashion a "new law on transsexuals, or anything else. 54
According to the court, its responsibility was to determine whether the jury,
as a fact finder, could be called upon to determine the legality of the
marriage of Christie to Jonathon. 5 The court held that in the absence of
guidelines, which it declined to establish, a jury could not make such a
determination.56 The court instead decided that Christie's sex was purely
a question of law7 to be determined by the court in the absence of a
5
legislative ruling.
Based upon the lack of legislative guidance and the sparse evidence
presented, the Texas Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision, ruled that Christie
Littleton was legally a male and therefore could not be Jonathon Littleton's
legal wife. 8 The two justices who ruled against Christie found that
Christie's sex was not a factual issue, but was solely a legal issue.59 They
declared as a matter of law that Christie was a male.6 The dissenting
justice believed that the issue was a factual one and that the evidence raised
a genuine issue of fact about whether Christie was a male or female and
summary judgment was therefore inappropriate.6 '

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

See id.
See id. at 225.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 230.
See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at231.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 234 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
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Ill. THE COURT'S OPINION

Chief Justice Phil Hardberger wrote the opinion for the court. 62 Justice
Karen Angelini concurred 63 in the judgment and Justice Alma Lopez
dissented.' This part of the Article reviews and critiques the basis for each
opinion.
A. ChiefJustice Hardberger'sOpinion
According to Justice Hardberger, this case involved only one issue: Is
Christie Littleton a male or a female?o Justice Hardberger restated the
issue three times in his opinion.' His phrasing of the issue foretold the
result he would reach. Justice Hardberger phrased the issue as follows:
* "The deeper philosophical (and now legal) question is: can
a physician change the gender of a person with a scalpel,
drugs and counseling, or is a person's gender immutably
fixed by our Creator at birth?"'67
• "Can there be a valid marriage between a man and a
person born as a man, but surgically 6altered
to have the
8
physical characteristics of a woman?
• "[T]he question remains whether the law will take note of
these changes" (the surgical and hormonal alteration of her
body and the legal change in name and sex on her birth
certificate)
"and treat her as if she had been born a
69
female.,
Justice Hardberger acknowledged that the issue of sex determination
involved profound philosophical,70 metaphysical, 7 ' and policy concerns.72
Despite these profound concerns, Justice Hardberger resolved the issue in
a simple manner. According to Justice Hardberger, Christie was born a
male and therefore she remained a male the rest of her life.73 In reaching

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 223.
See id. at 231 (Angelini, J., dissenting).
See id. at 232 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See id. at 223.
See id. at 224-26.

67. Id. at 224.
68. Id. at 225.
69. Id. at 226.

.70. See id. at 224.
71. See id. at 231.
72. See id. at 230.
73. See id. at 225.The only recognition of theimportanceof Christie's surgical and hormonal
treatment was in Justice Hardberger's statement of his conclusions when he acknowledged that
Christie has "made every conceivable effort to make herself a female, including a surgery that
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this result, Justice Hardberger assumed that Christie's sex modification
surgery was of no legal import, even though after the surgery, medical
experts agreed that she was medically a woman.74
To determine whether Christie Littleton was a female or male, Justice
Hardberger needed to establish the factors that should control the
determination of a person's legal sex. According to medical experts, the
typical medical criteria of sex include: genetic or chromosomal sex;
gonadal sex; internal morphologic sex; external morphologic sex;
hormonal sex; phenotypic sex; assigned sex/gender of rearing; and gender
identity.75
Justice Hardberger' s opinion does not explain the evidence or reasoning
that allowed him to conclude that Christie was currently a male. No
evidence was admitted regarding Christie's chromosomal make-up, but
Justice Hardberger presumed she had male (XY) chromosomes at birth and
at the time of trial.76 Christie's gonads, internal and external morphological
sex, hormones, and phenotype were male at birth, but had been altered
during her sex modification treatments. 7" At the time of trial, her gonads
and internal morphology were neither male nor female because her internal
sex organs had been surgically removed. Her external morphology and
phenotype were female because of surgical alteration and hormonal
administration. Christie had been reared as a male, but her self-identity was
female. 7' Therefore, Christie's sex indicators at the time of the trial were
ambiguous. Without a clear delineation of the factors that determine an
individual's legal sex, the basis for Justice Hardberger's ruling is unclear.79
Although Christie was labeled a male at birth, Justice Hardberger did not
provide any support for his conclusion that the sex designated at birth must
remain Christie's sex throughout her life.
Three pages of Justice Hardberger's opinion are devoted to a summary
of some of the cases that have involved the determination of a transsexual's

would make most males pale and perspire to contemplate." Id. at 231.
74. See id. at 224.
75. See JOHN MONEY, SEX ERRORS OF THE BODY AND RELATED SYNDROMES: A GUIDE TO
COUNSELING CHILDREN, ADOLESCENTS AND THEIR FAMILIES 4 (2d ed. 1994); see also Greenberg,
supra note 41, at 278-92 for a discussion of sexual differentiation.

76. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
77. See id. at 224.
78. See id.
79. Justice Hardberger listed a number of Christie's biological sex attributes in his
conclusion. See id. at 230-31. For instance, he stated that Christie's female attributes included
breasts, external genitalia, and a vaginal canal. See id. at 230. He acknowledged that her internal
organs were neither male nor female. See id. He concluded, however, that her chromosomes were
not surgically or hormonally altered and that therefore she was "[b]iologically ... still a male." Id.
His conclusion was that Christie's female anatomy was all "man made" and she inhabited a male
body in "all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied." Id. at 231.
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sex for purposes of marriage." Some of these cases have held that a
transsexual's sex should be determined by a combination of biological
factors, such as chromosomes, gonads and genitalia,81 while other courts
have emphasized the importance of psychological factors and selfidentification.82 Although Justice Hardberger cited the former cases with
approval, he did not clearly adopt any of the approaches chosen by these
courts. Instead, he assumed that Christie had been born a male, and absent
a legislative enactment declaring that post-operative transsexuals legally
become
their self-identified sex, she would forever remain a male under the
law. 83
The weakness in Justice Hardberger's approach is evident from recent
developments in research regarding sex determination. Medical and
psychological experts all agree that science has not yet determined the
factors that control gender self-identification." The only evidence that the
Texas court had before it when it rendered its decision were the affidavits
of two medical experts.8 5 Both experts asserted that Christie was medically
a woman and that her self-identity as a woman was probably a result of
neuro-biological, genetic, and neonatal environmental factors.86 In other
words, the evidence indicated that Christie's sex at birth was a combination
of male and female attributes. She had the chromosomes, hormones,
gonads and genitalia of a male, but her biological gender identity was in all
likelihood female.87 The proffered testimony of the medical experts in this
case indicated that they, and other medical authorities, recognize that
Christie is medically a woman and in all likelihood was biologically

80. See id. at 226-29; see also Greenberg, supra note 41, at 299-307 for a thorough
discussion of the cases cited by Justice Hardberger as well as other cases that have addressed this
issue.
81. See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett [1970] 2 All E.R. 33 (Eng.).
82. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 255 A.2d 204,207 (N.J. 1976); Attorney Gen. v. Otahuhu Family
Court [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
83. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
84. A 1995 study indicates that a section of the brain that is essential for sexual behavior is
larger in men than in women and that the brain structure of genetically male transsexuals is more
similar to female brains than to male brains. See Jiang-Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the
Human Brain and Its Relation to Transsexuality,378 NATURE 68, 68-70 (1995). William Reiner
is conducting a study of 27 infants born without penises. Twenty-five were raised as girls and two
were raised as boys. Of the 25 children raised as girls, 14 have already declared themselves to be
boys. See Study: GenderIdentity Decided in Womb, CHi. TRmB., May 13, 2000, at 5.
85. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 224-25.
86. See id. at 224.
87. Obviously, gender identity at birth is impossible to determine and cannot be considered
when officials establish the sex that originally will be indicated on an infant's birth certificate.
Nothing in the statutory or common law of Texas, however, mandates that the sex fixed at birth is
legally unalterable.
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destined to self-identify as a female."8 The court, however, decided as a
matter of policy to completely ignore Christie's sexual anatomy at the time
of trial and her gender self-identification as legal sex determinants.
Whether self-identity should be the paramount factor in the
determination of a person's legal sex is debatable, 9 but gender self-identity
should be at least one of the factors, especially for post-operative
transsexuals. If a court chooses to emphasize other biological factors over
self-identity for policy reasons, the position is defensible. To ignore,
however, the relevance of self-identity completely, as Justice Hardberger
chose to do, leads to a result that is contrary to current medical and
psychological research.9'
Although Justice Hardberger acknowledged that the issue of sex
determination raises profound policy concerns, 91 his opinion fails to
identify or address any of these concerns. More problematic is the fact that
the opinion does not state the factors that led Justice Hardberger to
conclude that Christie is legally a male. His opinion appears to hinge on the
fact that he believed "Our Creator" created a man that science tried
unsuccessfully (at least for legal purposes) to turn into a woman. 92
According to Justice Hardberger, 'The body Christie inhabits is a male
body in all aspects other than what the physicians have supplied."'93 If
Christie inhabits a male body, the only indication that the body is male are
her chromosomes, which the court presumed were XY.9
At the end of his opinion, Justice Hardberger simply concludes:
At the time of birth, Christie was a male, both anatomically
and genetically. The facts contained in the original birth
certificate were true and accurate, and the words contained in

88. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225. Of the eight factors that medical authorities use to
determine sex, only two factors, chromosomes and self-identified sex, appear to be immutable.
Gonads, internal and external morphology, hormones and phenotype can be altered. See e.g., Milton
Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Review and Clinical
Implications, 151 ARCHIVES OFPEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENTMED. 298 (1997); William Reiner, To
Be Male or Female-That Is the Question, 151 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 224
(1997). An argument can be made that gender self-identity should be the paramount factor for
determining a person's legal sex. See Greenberg, supra note 41, for a detailed examination of this
approach.
89. See Greenberg, supranote 41, for a discussion of the arguments in favor of emphasizing
self-identity as the critical determinant of a person's legal sex.
90. See Diamond, supra note 88; Reiner, supra note 88; Zhou, supra note 84.
91. See Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 230.
92. Id. at 224.
93. Id. at231.
94. Ironically, there was no evidence to indicate Christie's chromosomal make-up. Therefore,
summary judgment was inappropriate because Christie's chromosomal structure was a question of
fact.
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the amended certificate are not binding on this court. T rThere
are some things we cannot will into being. They just are.95
B. Justice Angelini's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Karen Angelini's concurring opinion is brief. She agreed with
Justice Hardberger that summary judgment was appropriate because the
court was presented with pure issues of law and public policy. 96 She also
agreed that biological considerations are preferable to psychological factors
as tools for determining sex.97 She did, however, acknowledge that when
biological factors are considered alone, that some people's sex may be
ambiguous, and that when that case is presented to the Texas court, the
analysis would necessarily be more complex.98 For a person who is a
transsexual, however, Justice Angelini agreed with Justice Hardberger that
physical anatomy at birth is dispositive.99 She, too, reached this conclusion
without analyzing the policy concerns at stake.
C. Justice Lopez's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alma Lopez, in her dissent, also acknowledged that sex
determination is a matter best addressed by the legislature.'0° In the absence
of legislation, however, Justice Lopez believed the court had two options:
it could establish guidelines for determining sex, which would serve as
precedential legal authority, or it could treat the issue as a question of fact
to be determined at the trial court level.'' Justice Lopez believed the court
should not establish the -factors that should control sex determination
because the court would be speculating on public policy concerns that had
not yet been addressed by the Texas legislature. 2 Instead, she examined
the evidence to see if a triable issue of fact existed regarding Christie's sex.
In reviewing the evidence, Justice Lopez found that the evidence was
contradictory.0 3 Christie's original birth certificate indicated that she was
a male, but her amended birth certificate, which was approved by a trial
court, indicated that she was female.,' Given this contradictory evidence,
Justice Lopez believed that summary judgment was inappropriate.)15
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 231.
See id. (Angelini, J., concurring).
See id. at 232 (Angelini, J., concurring)..
See id. (Angelini, J., concurring).
See id. (Angelini, J., concurring).
See id. at 234 (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See id. at 232-34 (Lopez, J., dissenting)..
See id. at 233 (Lopez, J., dissenting)..
See id. (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See id. (Lopez, J., dissenting).
See id. (Lopez, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Lopez was willing to let a fact finder determine
Christie's sex, it is clear from her opinion that she believed a transsexual's
self-identified sex should play an important role in the determination of her
legal sex. Justice Lopez acknowledged that birth attendants who are
charged with declaring a child's sex at birth do not always record an
accurate gender. 16 She also believed that Christie's gender was lawfully
corrected to read female pursuant to Texas law.'0 7 Therefore, she decided
that a fact finder should determine whether the original birth certificate or
the amended birth certificate accurately reflected Christie's true sex.
IV. WHEN ISA WOMAN AWOMAN REVISITED
States have the power to establish an individual's legal sex. The
exercise of this power has enormous consequences for the person whose
sex is at issue.108 For example, sex determination may affect whether an
individual is entitled:
" to be a husband/wife t° or father/mother;"
" to have a sex indicator on the person's official documents

106. See id. (Lopez, J., dissenting).
107. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 191.028 (Vernon 1992).
108. In addition to the ramifications discussed in this Article, sex determination may also affect
an individual's military obligations, liability under various criminal statutes, ability to participate
in some sporting events as a woman, right to social security benefits, right to protection under
particular disability statutes, and the right to be incarcerated with inmates of one's self-identified
sex if convicted of a crime. For a discussion of all the implications of sex determination, see
Greenberg, supra note 41, at n.20. Sex determination for one individual will also affect others who
are involved in relationships with the person whose sex may be ambiguous. See, e.g., Von Hoffburg
v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1980). In Von Hoffburg, Maria Von Hoffburg was contesting
her discharge from the United States Army for alleged homosexual tendencies. Id. at 634. Maria
Von Hoffburg self-identified as a heterosexual, but she was discharged because the person she
married was a female-to-male transsexual, and the army therefore declared that Maria was a lesbian.
See id. at 634-35.
109. See Greenberg, supra note 41, at 299-308. Whether a husband/wife relationship exists
also has profound implications. It will control, among other things, the right to: inherit, receive
employment related benefits such as social security and insurance, file a joint tax return, receive
spousal and child support in the event of a marital dissolution, and as in Littleton, state a cause of
action for wrongful death.
110. See, e.g.,TransgenderRuling, L.A. DAiLY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at I (citing Vecchione v.
Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769). In Vecchione, a woman, Kristie, married a post-operative
female-to-male transsexual, Joshua. See id. Kristie maintained that Joshua should not have custody
rights to the child who was conceived during their five year marriage by artificial insemination
using sperm from Joshua's brother. See id. If Kristie could successfully void the marriage, Joshua
would not be the child's legal father. See id. The trial court ruled that the marriage was valid and
Joshua was the legal father. See id.
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that accurately reflects the individual's gender identity;"..
and
to state a gender-based claim for employment
discrimination or violation
of the constitutional right to
2
equal protection." 1
For most people, sex classification is not a controversial issue. For
transsexuals, however, sex determination is complex. Many state
legislatures and courts have not yet ruled on the legal sex status of
transsexuals. A number of state legislatures, however, have examined the
issue and have adopted legislation allowing post-operative transsexuals to
alter their official documents so that the documents reflect their owner's
self-identified sex."' The U.S. government has adopted this approach for
passports." 4 Because not all state legislatures have adopted controlling
legislation, courts in some states have established the guidelines for sex
determination." 5
Although some legislatures and courts have established guidelines for
determining which sex will appear on a person's official documents, this
sex determination may not control whether individuals can legally marry
as their self-identified sex. In some cases, courts may simply ignore the sex
designation on the official document as Justice Hardberger did in Christie's
case. In otherjurisdictions, courts have acknowledged that different policy
concerns are relevant for determining an individual's sex for purposes of
marriage and for otherpurposes.1 6 Therefore, the sex designation indicated
I 11. See supra note 5 for relevant statutes and Greenberg, supra note 41, at 308-17 for a
detailed discussion of the relevant cases.
112. See Greenberg, supra note 41, at 317-25.
113. See supra note 5.
114. Foreign Relations, Evidence of U.S. Citizenship or Nationality, 22 C.F.R. § 51.43 (1999)
(controlling the issuance of passports). The Department of State Procedures Manual (on file with
the author) states that new passports indicating an individual's self-identified sex will be issued to
individuals who have undergone surgery. Pre-operativetranssexuals can obtain temporary passports
that are valid for one year and can be extended upon submission of appropriate medical
documentation that shows the surgery was completed. Although the sex indicator on the passport
cannot determine an individual's sex for purposes of state law, the passport may be used by its
holder for identification purposes. Therefore, if a post-operative transsexual uses the passport to
obtain a marriage license, and no one later contests the validity of the marriage (as did Dr. Prange),
the parties to the marriage will receive all the benefits married couples receive.
115. See Greenberg, supra note 41, at 317-35 for a thorough discussion of these cases.
116. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976). In M.T. v. J.T., the
court acknowledged that several criteria may be relevant in determining an individual's sex. Id. at
208-10. It declared that in most instances external genitalia should be the most significant
determinant of sex classification at birth. See id. at 208-09. The court distinguished sex
classification at birth from other areas and found that for purposes such as public records, service
in the military, participation in athletic competitions, and eligibility for certain kinds of
employment, other tests in addition to genitalia may be important. See id. at 209.
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on a person's official documents may not comport with the sex role in
which the person can legally marry.
In marriages involving transsexuals, the major policy issue that
concerns the courts, as Justice Hardberger indicated in Littleton, is the
state's interest in limiting marriages to heterosexual unions.1 17 A majority
of states have adopted statutes that prohibit marriages between individuals
specifically
of the same sex. The jurisdictions that have18statutes that
120
119
Arkansas,
Arizona,
Alaska,'
include:
marriages
same-sex
prohibit
124 Georgia,' 2 Hawaii,'26
California,' Colorado,' 22 Delaware, 123 Florida,
29 Kansas,' 30 Louisiana,'
128
27
Maryland,' 32
Indiana,
Idaho,' Illinois,
13 7
5
13
34
Montana, 136 New Hampshire,
Michigan,'3 3 Minnesota,1 Missouri,
1
40
39
South Dakota,14 1
North Carolina, 138 Puerto Rico, South Carolina
Tennessee,' 42 Texas, 143 Utah,' 44 and Virginia. 45 Congress has also passed
DOMA, the Defense of Marriage Act,' 46 which defines marriage at the
federal level as a "legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a person of the

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Littleton, 9 S.W.3d at 225.
See ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.011 (a) (Michie 1998).
See AR1Z. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(c) (West 1998).
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 1998).
See CAL FAM. CODE § 300 (West 1994 & Supp. 1999).
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-104 (West 1997).
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 101(a) (Supp. 1998).
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04(1) (West Supp. 1999).
See GA. CODEANN. § 19-3-3.1 (1998).
See HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572-1 (Supp. 1997).
See IDAHO CODE § 32-201(1) (1997).
See 750 ILL COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/212(a)(5) (West 1998).
See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (Michie 1997).
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (Supp. 1998).
See LA. CIr. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1993).
See MD. CODEANN. § 2-201 (1991).
See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 551.1 (Law. Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 1998).
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01 (West 1999).
See MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 1997).
See MONT. CODEANN. § 40-1-103 (1997).
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1 (1992).
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1997).
See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 221 (1993).
See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (West 1998).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1998).
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-104 (1999).
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.001(b) (Vernon 1998).
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (Michie 1995).
See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1998).
Defense of Marriage Act, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
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opposite sex who is a husband or a wife."147 Thus far, all courts (other than
the courts in Hawaii 4 8 and Vermont'4 9 ) that have been asked to resolve the
issue have ruled that same-sex marriages are illegal. 50
In making the determination that "same-sex" marriages are illegal, the
courts and legislatures were not considering marriages involving post5
operative transsexuals; they were considering gay and lesbian marriages.1 1
Adding transsexuals into the marital equation makes identifying "samesex" marriages more problematic. To fully understand the implications of
the court decisions that have ruled that transsexuals cannot legally marry
in their post-operative self-identified sex, the policy concerns underlying
the limitation of marriage to persons of the "opposite sex" must be
analyzed and applied to marriages in which one of the spouses is a
transsexual.
Two types of marriages involving post-operative transsexuals (Marriage
A and Marriage B) can potentially occur. 52 Marriage A mirrors the facts

147. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (Supp. 1997). According to its legislative history, DOMA has two primary
purposes: "to defend the institution of traditional heterosexual marriage" and "to protect the rights
of the states to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal recognition of same-sex
[marriages]." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998).
148. In Baehrv. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67-68 (Haw. 1993), the Supreme Court of Hawaii held
that the state's failure to recognize same-sex marriages is subject to strict scrutiny under the Hawaii
Constitution, and the state would have to show a compelling interest to justify its restriction. It
remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the state could demonstrate such an
interest. See id. at 68. On remand, the trial court found that the state did not demonstrate a
compelling interest. See Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1934, WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec.
3, 1996). This circuit court decision was stayed, pending a second appeal to the Hawaii Supreme
Court. See id. The courts' actions were challenged by a referendum. On November 3, 1998, voters
in Hawaii approved a legislative act to prohibit same-sex marriages in their state (changing the
Hawaii state constitution to read, "the Legislature should have the power to reserve marriage to
opposite-sex couples"). Cheryl Wetzstein, Two States Define 'Marriage',WASHINGTON TIMES,
Nov. 1, 1998, at A4.
149. In Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999), the Vermont Supreme Court held
that under the Vermont Constitution, same sex couples could not be deprived of the statutory
benefits and protections afforded to persons of the opposite sex who choose to marry. The court
held that these benefits could be provided by either recognizing same-sex marriages or by adopting
a statutory equivalent to marriage for same-sex couples, such as a domestic partnership law. See id.
The court left the decision of whether to recognize same-sex marriages or adopt a domestic
partnership law to the Vermont legislature. The Vermont legislature enacted a statute that
recognizes civil unions between same-sex couples. The legislation provides such couples the same
benefits as married heterosexual couples. See Ross Sneyd, Vermont Governor Signs Gay Union
Bill, Associated Press, Apr. 26, 2000, availablein 2000 WL 19884854.
150. See Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The
Disaggregationof Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 42 n.165 (1995).
151. See, e.g., Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. App. 1995); Jones v.
Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187) (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
152. To simplify the analysis, only post-operative male-to-female transsexuals are being
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in Littleton v. Prange.In other words, in Marriage A, a male (Jonathon)
marries a post-operative male-to-female transsexual (Christie), and they
live in what they consider to be a heterosexual relationship. Marriage B
also involves a marriage to a post-operative male-to-female transsexual
(Christie), but in this case the other spouse is a female (Jane) and Christie
and Jane live in what they consider to be a same-sex marriage. The
relationships described in Marriage B exist and will eventually come before
the courts. 153 It has been well-established that gender identity and sexual
orientation15 4do not necessarily correlate and should not mistakenly be
conflated.
When faced with determining the legality of these two marriages, courts
and legislatures have four options:
1. They could declare that Christie is a man and rule that
Marriage A violates the state's prohibition against samesex marriage. If Christie is legally a man, then presumably
Marriage B must be valid.
2. They could declare that Christie is a woman and rule that
Marriage B violates the state's prohibition against samesex marriage. If Christie is legally a woman, then
presumably Marriage A must be valid.
3. They could declare that Christie is neither a man nor a
woman and she cannot legally marry anyone. Under this
approach, neither Marriage A nor Marriage B would be
valid.
4. They could declare that Christie could be either a man or
a woman and Marriage A and Marriage B are both valid.
It is doubtful that Texas, or most other jurisdictions, would choose the
fourth option. To do so would be contrary to our binary sex classification

discussed. Two other types of marriages involving transsexuals could also occur. A post-operative
female-to-male transsexual could marry either a male or a female. If a post-operative female-tomale transsexual marries a woman, the marriage would be analogous to Marriage A; if he marries
a man, the marriage would be similar to Marriage B.
153. See Chris Beam, ForBetter or For Worse?, OUT, May 2000, at 60, 64; Jilly Beattie &
Sara Lain, The Wedding with Two Brides... and One Is a Man!; Lesbian Lovers Both Wear a
Dressfor Britain'sWeirdest-EverMarriage; "I Was a Chick-with-a-Dick-ThenI HadMy Op and
Woke up as a Girl:" Lesbians to Legally MarryBecause One Is an Ex-Man, THE PEOPLE, June 11,
1995, at 2; Oregon Couple Adds Twist to Love Story: The Bride and Groom Planto Wed Legally,
But Then the Man Intends to Have His Gender Altered, MORNING NEWS TRIB.'(Tacoma, Wash.),
Dec. 14, 1996, at A3; Afi-Odelia E. Scruggs, Tying Legalities into Tangled Knot, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Oct. 7, 1996, at IB; Michael Vigh, TranssexualWeds Woman in Legally Recognized
Union, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 5, 1999, at IC.
154. See ROBERT POOL, EVE'S RIB: SEARCHING FOR THE BIOLOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX
DIFFERENCES 137 (1994).
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system and would also be an acknowledgment that same-sex marriages
may be legal. Numerous scholars have called for an end to the ban on
same-sex marriages. 5 Despite the criticisms leveled against limiting
marriage to opposite sex couples, it appears that marriage will continue to
be limited to heterosexual unions in most jurisdictions.'56
Most jurisdictions are also unlikely to adopt the third option and declare
that post-operative transsexuals cannot legally marry. Although an
Australian court adopted the third approach in a case involving a marriage
between a woman and an hermaphrodite,"5 7 it would be difficult for a
United States court to constitutionally defend this position. The United
States Supreme Court has acknowledged that marriage is a fundamental
right under the United States Constitution.' Therefore, denying an
individual the right to marry anyone at all should be held to be
unconstitutional.
Unless courts and legislatures are willing to deny transsexuals the
constitutional right to marry, they have only two choices. They must
recognize the validity of either Marriage A or Marriage B. In other words,
legal institutions must decide whether Christie is legally entitled to marry
Jonathon or Jane.
In Littleton, the court declared that Christie was legally a male and thus
could not marry Jonathon. Therefore, Marriage A is illegal in Texas.
Although the court did not confront the issue, the court implicitly found
that Christie could legally marry Jane because it ruled that Christie is
legally a male. To determine whether this decision is correct, the policy
concerns that have led states to limit marriage to heterosexual unions must
be considered.
The traditional arguments against same-sex marriage fall into four
groups: 5 9 (1) marriage has always been a union between one man and one
woman and same-sex marriage violates the traditions and morals of

155. For an overview of these arguments, see SAMlE-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON (Andrew
Sullivan ed., 1997).
156. Mary Coombs has argued that the acceptance of transsexual marriages will eventually
lead to a deconstructing of the sexual categories and the acceptance of marriage for all individuals
regardless of their sex or sexual orientation. Mary Coombs, SexualDis-orientation:Transgendered
People and Same-Sex Marriage,8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 219, 260 (1998). Although this goal
may eventually be reached, in the interim, courts and legislatures must set a standard for sexual
determination so that transsexuals are able to marry someone.
157. See Marriage of C. and D. (Falsely called C.), (1979) 35 F.L.R. 340,343 (Austl.).
158. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1, 12 (1967). "The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights
of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival." Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
159. See Coombs, supra note 156, at 228.
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society;" 6 (2) traditional marriage is both a core of our civilization and an
institution currently under threat; putting same-sex relationships on the
same level as traditional marriages would undermine the status that is
necessary to preserve traditional marriage;' (3) marriage is a vehicle for
procreation; the essence of marriage is the potentially procreative marital
sexual act; and such an act cannot occur in same-sex relationships; 162 and
(4) same sex marriages pose a risk to children because of a threat to moral
values and the possibility that children would be raised in less
than an ideal
63
household arrangement containing a mother and a father.
Given these policy concerns, should courts and legislatures declare that
Christie can legally marry Jonathon or legally marry Jane?
Opponents of same-sex marriages would probably oppose legalizing
either marriage. Opponents of same-sex marriage would likely assert that
both Marriage A and Marriage B:
* threaten societal traditions and morals because Marriage A
legally sanctions transsexuals changing the sex that was
"fixed by our Creator," while Marriage B to all outward
appearances looks like a same-sex marriage;
• undermine traditional marriages by putting transsexual
marriages on the same footing as traditional marriages;
* are non-procreative because all post-operative transsexuals
are incapable of impregnating someone or carrying a child
to term; 64 and
* fail to model the moral values that should be instilled in
children. Marriage A does not provide a positive model
because it does not reflect society's traditional view of sex
and gender roles and children would likely perceive
Marriage B to be a same-sex marriage.
Thus, opponents of same-sex marriage would likely oppose both
Marriage A and Marriage B. Therefore, the policy reasons that lead
opponents of same-sex marriage to oppose gay and lesbian marriages do
not help to clarify whether Christie legally should be able to marry
Jonathon or Jane. Unless courts and legislatures are willing to take the
extreme step of ruling that post-operative transsexuals are neither males nor

160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 229.
163. See id.
164. Post-operative transsexuals could become biological parents of a child if, prior to their
sex-modification operation, they have their sperm or eggs frozen and later use the sperm or eggs

in an artificial insemination procedure.
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females and are not entitled to the constitutional right to marry guaranteed
to every other person, they must analyze policy concerns in addition to the
concerns related to the prohibition against same-sex marriages. The courts
and legislatures must consider whether legalizing the marriage between
Christie and Jonathon or legalizing the marriage between Christie and Jane
better furthers the values that the law and society seek to promote.
The justices who decided Littleton and other courts that have reached
the same result did not adequately analyze the values they promoted when
they rendered their decisions.165 Most of the courts that have denied postoperative transsexuals the right to marry as their self-identified sex did so
for one of two reasons. Some ruled against the transsexual because of the
perceived inability of the post-operative transsexual to engage in "true
heterosexual sex"'" and to perform the "essential role that a woman or a
man must perform in marriage."' 167 Others justified their ruling on the
theory they did not want the legal system to be used to help psychologically
ill persons in their social adaptation. 168
As indicated above, whenever post-operative transsexuals marry, they
will be entering into a relationship in which they will not be engaging in
"traditional" heterosexual sex. In Marriage A, the sexual act will utilize
genitalia that were created by doctors and therefore under the view of some
courts it could not be "true" heterosexual sex. 169 In Marriage B, the sexual
act will utilize genitalia that are identical in appearance and therefore the
sexual act clearly does not fit into the "traditional" concept of heterosexual
sex.
The second concern, not wanting to assist "psychologically ill persons"
in their social adaptation, does not reflect or incorporate current research
on transsexuality. As indicated above, current studies indicate that
transsexuality may have a biological basis 7 ' and core gender identity

165. The facts of the cases involving transsexual marriages have not been provided because
the facts are not critical to the policy concerns being discussed here, Some of the cases involved
pre-operative transsexuals, but most involved post-operative transsexuals. In all cases, the nontranssexual participant in the marriage was contesting the validity of the marriage. For a thorough
discussion of the facts of these cases, see Greenberg, supra note 40, at 299-307.
166. See, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett [1970] 2 All E.R. 33,48 (Eng.). In Corbett, the court found
that "sexual intercourse, using the completely artificial cavity," cannot be described as "ordinary
and complete intercourse." Id. at 49. The court also stated, "When such a cavity has been
constructed in a male, the difference between sexual intercourse using it, and anal or intra-crural
intercourse is, in my judgment, to be measured in centimetres." Id.
167. Id.; see also B v. B, 355 N.Y.S.2d 712,713-714 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); W v. W [1976]
2 SALR 308.
168. See, e.g., Hartin v. Director of the Bureau of Records, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515,517 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1973).
169. See Corbett v. Corbett [1970] 2 All E.R. 33,49-50 (Eng.).
170. See Zhou, supra note 84.
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appears to be fixed at birth and likely is not subject to alteration.' 71
Therefore, regardless of whether the court chooses to recognize their
marriages, transsexuals will continue to live in their self-identified sex role.
If the Littleton court had held that Christie's marriage to Jonathon was
legal, what values would it have promoted? Legalizing Christie's marriage
to Jonathon would:
1. Bring the law into conformity with other disciplines such
as medicine and psychology;
2. Encourage uniformity in the law by allowing transsexuals
to marry in the sex that conforms to the sex indicator on
their official documents;
3. More accurately reflect society's view of what constitutes
a same-sex marriage;
4. Encourage socially responsible behavior by parties to a
marriage; and
5. Have a positive therapeutic effect on the people most
affected by these rulings.
As indicated above, recent developments in medicine and psychology
indicate that core gender identity probably has a biological basis and
appears to be immutable. 7 2 Therefore, many scientific experts accept the
fact that transsexuality is not a disorder that can be cured by drugs or
counseling. If legal institutions ban transsexuals from marrying in their
post-operative sex role, transsexuals will be encouraged by the medical
community to live in their self-identified role and at the same time will be
legally barred from marrying someone of the "opposite sex."
Allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry as their self-identified
sex will also help to promote uniformity in the law. Most legislatures that
have addressed the issue have decided that post-operative transsexuals are
legally entitled to amend their identity documents so that they accurately
reflect their self-identified sex.' 73 It appears that only one legislature that
has specifically addressed this issue decided that post-operative
transsexuals cannot amend their official documents. 74 The U.S.
government has also adopted this approach for passports.' 75 Therefore,
allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry in their self-identified sex
will encourage uniformity in the law by bringing marital law into
conformity with the law regarding official documents.
Allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry as their self-identified
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

See Diamond, supra note 88; Reiner, supra note 88.
See Diamond, supra note 88; Reiner, supra note 88; Zhou, supra note 84.
See supra note 5.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-203(d) (1996).
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
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sex will also more accurately reflect society's perception of what
constitutes an "opposite-sex" marriage. Society viewed Christie's marriage
to Jonathon as a heterosexual union. The official in Kentucky who issued
the marriage licence and the official in Texas who issued the amended birth
certificate both believed that Christie was a woman. If Christie's marriage
to Jonathon is legal, to all outward appearances, the marriage looks like a
heterosexual relationship. If instead, Christie's marriage to Jane is declared
legal, the marriage will appear to be a state sanctioned same-sex marriage.
Legalizing Christie's marriage to Jonathon will also promote socially
responsible behavior by the parties to the marriage. Except for Littleton, all
reported cases challenging the validity of a transsexual marriage have been
brought by the transsexual's spouse. 7 6 Typically, these actions have been
brought to avoid paying spousal support or to avoid a declaration that a
child born during the marriage was legally the child of both parties to the
marriage.' 77 Allowing a party to a marriage to avoid an obligation that they
knowingly and voluntarily assumed is not a value society or the law
typically seeks to promote. Declaring such marriages invalid frustrates the
original intent and agreement of the parties to the marriage.
Finally, denying post-operative transsexuals the right to marry as their
self-identified sex is extraordinarily harmful to transsexuals. Transsexuals
are seeking to have their gender self-identity recognized by the law and by
society. Transsexuals have traditionally been forced into the closet because
of the ostracism society has directed at them. 17 Denying post-operative
transsexuals the fundamental right to marry in their self-identified sex
further ostracizes and marginalizes them. The promotion of emotional
well-being should be one of the goals of the law as long as such promotion
does not subordinate other important justice values. 7 9 Forbidding post176. It appears that other cases are now being brought by people other than the parties to the
marriage. For example, in Kansas, the son of a decedent who died intestate challenged the right of
the decedent's wife's (a post-operative male-to-female transsexual) to inherit. The case is currently
on appeal and as of this date no decision has been rendered. See Spurgeon, supra note 12. (Trial
court documents are on file with the author.)
177. See, e.g., TransgenderRuling, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 26, 1997, at 1 (citing Vecchione v.
Vecchione, Civ. No. 96D003769). In Vecchione, a wife sought a declaration that her five-year
marriage to her transsexual husband, Joshua, was invalid. See id. She sought this declaration so that
Joshua would not be able to claim that he was the legal father of their daughter. See id. Some
marital annulment actions involve fraud because the complaining spouses were unaware of their
partners' transsexual status at the time of the marriage. Marriages entered into on the basis of fraud
are typically voidable and the courts do not need to declare these marriages invalid on the basis of
sex determination. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
178. See KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAW: ON MEN, WOMEN, AND THE REST OF Us 8
(1994).
179. This position has been advocated by supporters oftherapeuticjurisprudence. Therapeutic
jurisprudence calls for the exploration of the ways in which the law can achieve therapeutic
consequences that are consistent with other legal values. Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudenceof
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operative transsexuals the right to marry in their self-identified sex does not
promote any important legal or societal values. Conversely, allowing postoperative transsexuals to marry in their self-identified sex will promote
therapeutic consequences and does not conffict with any other justice
values.
The reported cases that allowed post-operative transsexuals to marry in
their self-identified sex recognized and emphasized the importance of the
social and psychological aspects of sex and gender identification 8 ° and
found that allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry in their selfidentified sex is practical, realistic and humane."'8 According to one court,.
it will promote the transsexual's quest "for inner peace and personal
any societal interest, principle of
happiness, while in no way disserving
12
public order or precept of morality.'
V. CONCLUSION

Most of the cases that have held that post-operative transsexuals cannot
legally marry as their self-identified sex were decided almost thirty years
ago. Since these cases were decided, two significant events have occurred.
First, scientific research on sexual identity and sexual orientation has
established that: (a) core gender identity is likely established prior to birth
and may be immutable;1 3 (b) transsexuality is not necessarily related to
sexual orientation; 8 4 and (c) post-operative transsexuals are medically
considered to be their self-identified sex.' 85 Second, the transsexual
movement has become more active and many more actions involving
transsexual marriages will likely reach the appellate courts.
Thus far, courts have only had to determine whether a marriage between
individuals like Christie and Jonathon is valid. Soon, they likely will have
to resolve whether individuals like Christie can legally marry Jane. Most
of the cases that have ruled that post-operative transsexuals do not legally
acquire their self-identified sex have believed that such rulings would
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in LAW INA THERAPEUTIC KEY: DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE 645, 646 (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Winick eds., 1996).
180. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. 1976); Attorney Gen. v. Otahuhu Family Court
(1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603.
181. See M.T., 355 A.2dat209.
182. Id. at211.
183. See Zhou, supra note 84; Diamond, supra note 88; Reiner, supra note 88.
184. See supra note 153; POOL, supra note 154.
185. The Littleton court even accepted the stipulation of the parties as to this fact. See Littleton
v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 225 (Tex. App. 1999). The court did not appear to be troubled by the fact
that another discipline, medicine, had determined that Christie is a female. Although legal
institutions are not bound by medical findings, Justice Hardberger never stated any reason to justify
his complete rejection of the experts' proffered testimony and the stipulation of the parties that
Christie is medically a female.
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promote traditional morals and values. When these same courts are
inevitably presented with a marriage of a post-operative transsexual who
also identifies as a gay or lesbian, they will have to reassess exactly what
values their earlier rulings furthered. When courts are asked to resolve the
fundamental question of "when is a man a man, and when is a woman a
woman," they need to thoroughly consider exactly what values they are
advancing when they render their decisions. Until partners in same-sex
unions are guaranteed the same rights as married, heterosexual couples,
allowing post-operative transsexuals to marry in their self-identified sex is
the most humane result and better furthers the values society seeks to
promote.
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